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JAMES KEYTE:

Fred, we are in a Fireside

Chat now, with people out on the floor in the
ballroom.
I do think it is an amazing thing we can do,
and it’s very cool, and we will certainly work in the
future on making it easier for people to access and
also run their mics and cameras when they access.
It’s just part of what we are going to have to go
through as we get used to this kind of technology and
use it even when we are in a world where it is not
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forced upon us.
Many people out there obviously know who you
are and what you have been doing, but for those who do
not, let me start with an introduction.
Fred Jenny is Professor of Economics at
ESSEC Business School in Paris.

Since 1994 he has

been the Chairman of the OECD’s Competition Committee.
He is Co-Director of the European Center for Law and
Economics.

He was a judge on the French Supreme Court

— I assume probably the only economist on that court.
He was a Vice Chair of the French Competition
Authority.

He has a Ph.D. in Economics from Harvard

and a Doctorate in Economics from the University of
Paris.

The list could go on.

I don’t know if I have

missed any of the major highlights.
He is just an incredible figure, always
active in the antitrust academic community.

The

pieces coming out of the OECD are incredibly thorough
and balanced.
What I want you to do first, Fred, is just
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explain to people what the OECD does in the
competition space, your role in it, and what you are
up to even now in that space.
FREDERIC JENNY:

First of all, thank you

very much for having invited me to this Fireside Chat.
The OECD — it’s interesting that you asked
this question.

A few years ago I was asked that

question by a visiting delegation from the U.S. Senate
— I think it was the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee — and they sat in front of me and asked,
“Why should the United States support a United Nations
organization?”

I told them, “OECD is not a United

Nations organization.”
JAMES KEYTE:

I know that much.

FREDERIC JENNY:

The OECD is a gathering of

thirty-six countries now, and more
becoming members.

countries are

In the Competition Committee, in

addition to the delegates of the member states, we
have fifteen observers, so we are talking about fiftythree country delegations really.
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The OECD is divided into various
directorates and committees.

One of the aspects of

the OECD which is particularly important is that it
covers the whole spectrum of economic policies.

One

is competition; taxation, anti-corruption, trade,
consumer protection, investment etc., etc. What this
means is that the institution is designed to promote
policy coherence and to explore complementarities
among economic policies. So we look at issues such as
trade and competition or competition and employment or
growth and competition etc… with our colleagues in
other Committees as well as at pure competition
issues.
About fifty-four delegations come to Competition
Committee meetings. In most cases, these days, the
delegates

are heads or high officials

of the

competition authorities of the Member countries. When
I was first elected Committee Chair, the members of
the Committee were for the most part officials from
ministries . But since then Competition authorities in
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numerous jurisdictions have become independent.
In the context of OECD our committee is free
to decide what we want to focus on.
The way we work is quite different from that
of the International Competition Network.
First, we have a very able secretariat team
of lawyers and economists.

Among other things, when

we take up a topic the secretariat prepares background
notes. Background notes are tremendously useful
because, for each topic, they explain the underlying
issues, the jurisprudence in various countries and the
challenges for the future.
Second, when we have a roundtable on a
topic, we invite experts, who are often academics, but
may also be judges or business people or specialists
of other fields, to come and dialogue with us. This
dialogue is generally very open and enlightening. The
experts may express their opinions on this or that
decision by a competition authority or judgment by a
court. This type of discussion brings out what these
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experts see as a possible criticism or what they see
as the strong points of what we do. They also help us
think about new challenges facing competition
authorities.
Third,
Committee

the delegates of the Competition

present a large number of contributions in

which they express their approaches, describe their
cases and discuss the relevance of various issues and
I cannot thank them enough for that.
The roundtables are extremely valuable not
only for the competition authorities themselves but
for the legal and economic community as well.
They allow us to explore difficult or new
topics in competition law enforcement.

For example,

we have had more than ten different panels related to
the challenges of competition law enforcement in the
digital sector — on artificial intelligence, on
blockchains, platforms and multisided markets

etc…

These exchanges allow competition authorities to learn
from one another as well as to learn from the best
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experts in the world.
A related facet of our work is the
production of recommended good practices. Those
recommendations are proposed by the committee by
consensus and endorsed by the Council of the OECD.
They carry a certain amount of weight because by the
time they are adopted by the OECD Council they have
already become governmental recommendations adopted on
the basis of the work that the Committee has done in
various sectors. It has produced recommendations on
the fight against cartels, on international
cooperation, on structural separation in network
industries etc….
The Committee meets twice a year, and there
is a third session with competition authorities from
non-OECD member countries, called the OECD Global
Forum on Competition, which is held back to back with
one of the two Committee sessions.
Forum usually around 110

At each Global

competition authorities are

represented together with a number of international
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organizations such as the WTO, the World Bank etc….
For the discussions

during this Global Forum, we

choose topics which are of interest both to the
developed country members of OECD and

to less-

developed countries.

We also have three regional centers — one in
Latin America, one in Hungary for Eastern Europe, and
one in Korea for Asia — and

organize many teaching

and programs for judges and competition officials in
those regional centers.
JAMES KEYTE:

That’s perfect, Fred.

Is the output of the OECD’s Competition
Committee easily available to the public?

Is it a

Google search away or is there some way to access it?
FREDERIC JENNY:

One of the characteristics

of the OECD Competition Committee is transparency.
Everything,meaning all the written contributions of
delegates, the background note of the secretariat, the
papers of the experts and the summary of the
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discussion is on the OECD competition web site.
To be honest, when I became chairman of the
Committee, I had been a delegate for a few years and I
had seen the pain of negotiating long reports. Even
though there were fewer OECD members at the time, a
lot of time was wasted in trying to find common
language on issues where competition authorities had
differences. We decided to do away with this and
publish everything that is produced.

to

All of this is

available on the OECD Competition website.
What we have published in the past

and what

we continue publishing is an extremely useful source
of information for the competition community.

We have

been doing this for twenty-five years, so there are a
great many topics that have been selected by the
members. Going to the OECD competition website is a
great source to find out, about nearly every topic,
what are the issues and what are the cases that have
been dealt with by various competition authorities on
this particular topic.
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JAMES KEYTE:
background notes.

I didn’t even know about the

So if you want to dive deep into

different positions that were put forward by different
constituents ——
FREDERIC JENNY:

The OECD Competition

website is used by a large number of competition
specialists.

It is used by lawyers in many countries,

but it is also used by judges and competition
officials.

Very often, when competition officials or

judges or lawyers have a case, the first thing they do
once they have identified the issue is to go to the
OECD site to see whether we have background notes and
contributions on the topic, to quickly learn about
similar cases, what decisions were made, and what the
issues are.
JAMES KEYTE:

When you are on a topic —

let’s say the digital economy — certainly many years
ago that was on the horizon; you probably started
talking about it; maybe you had a report.
some reports that kind of take a historical

Do you have

11

retrospective on a topic?

Is the general approach

that when you are now doing a report on Big Tech you
are going to incorporate learning from all those past
reports as well?
FREDERIC JENNY:

Yes, we do.

I would say

that about every ten years we go back to the same
topic.

We do not want to do it too often, because

that would be a bit boring, but after eight to ten
years we go back to the same topic and build on
previous contributions, background notes and experts’
papers.
JAMES KEYTE:

It is interesting that part of

the scope includes, in a sense, non-pure competition
issues.
Last year, I think there was a lot of
discussion about industrial policy in Europe in the
Member States, in particular about creating national
champions, wanting perhaps even to modify or have some
kind of — I don’t know if you want to call them veto
rights, but certainly a way to trump a competition
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decision based on national champions.
Did the OECD take that subject up?
FREDERIC JENNY:

Of course we try to

anticipate what the important issues are going to be.
In recent years, we had a close look at the
interaction between competition and industrial policy
and a discussion about the institutional design of
competition authorities.
JAMES KEYTE:

What was the outcome of that?

That is a very politically charged topic.
FREDERIC JENNY:
The relationship between industrial policy
and competition policy has been a topic which was
discussed in the Global Forum, so the forum in which
we looked at this issue was even larger than the OECD
Committee. The reason is that the relationship between
these two policies is an issue worldwide.
One clear lesson is that an enlightened
competition policy and strong law enforcement are
necessary conditions for achieving efficiency and for
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the promotion of consumer welfare but they may not be
sufficient to deal with some market failures and to
promote economic growth. So there is a legitimate
economic role for industrial policy. There may also be
socio-political reasons why governments may want to
intervene in markets mechanisms. And there may be
cases where industrial policy measures are designed to
restrict competition because governments have
willingly or unwillingly been captured by special
interest groups. Altogether, industrial policy is a
bit like cholesterol. There is good cholesterol and
there is bad cholesterol.
I think
has not done

that what the competition community

and what it should do

time thinking about

is to spend some

what a procompetitive industrial

policy would look like and to promote this type of
industrial policy as a useful complement to
competition policy.
That is too bad, because in fact when you
study industrial policy in details, you find that in
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some countries,

the United States for example,

some

industrial policy programs conceived by the Defense
Advanced Research Projects

Agency (DARPA) succeeded

in achieving technological advances, maintaining
competition among lines of research, engaging the
business community, facilitating the dialogue between
researchers, and weeding out the failing projects from
the successful ones.
This approach, which combines industrial
policy and competition, is quite different from the
type of industrial policy that used to exist in
Europe, where a national champion was chosen and
entrusted with the task of developing a new
technology.
I think that there would be a lot of value
in trying to, first of all, show that industrial
policy is a natural complement to competition policy
and not in opposition to competition policy; and
second, that there are procedures that allow countries
to have an active industrial policy while at the same
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time respecting competition.
JAMES KEYTE:

Yes.

And really the great

thing about the transparency at the OECD is if someone
put forth that position paper, you would have all the
notes debating that and all the contrary positions.

I

look forward to that.
Let me move to what’s very current now in
this part of our conference and ask if you think that
the antitrust principles and analytical frameworks
currently being used in Europe and elsewhere can
accommodate the digital economy and the rapid changes
even within the digital economy.

Do we need something

else or can we do it with what we have?
FREDERIC JENNY:

That’s a pretty broad

question.
JAMES KEYTE:

It is.

Barry Hawk would go

for hours I suspect.
FREDERIC JENNY:

Do I have three hours to

answer that question? [Laughter]
I think that there are different issues.

16

First, there is the question of whether
competition authorities are able to identify
anticompetitive situations in the digital sector.
Second, there is the question of: If we find
them, should they be sanctioned in the same way as
similar practices in the non digital world?
To be honest, on this second issue my answer
is yes.
The most troubling question is:

How

difficult is it for competition authorities to
identify anticompetitive practices or transactions in
a digital economy?

To try to answer this question, I

think one needs to differentiate between information
technology and communication technology.
The technological developments in
communication technology have basically allowed us to
overcome distances, to make communication easier, to
facilitate matching, and, in fact, to encourage the
division of labor.

Roughly speaking, those

technological developments are procompetitive.
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Competition authorities have, of course, had
many difficulties applying their traditional tools to
communication markets because those markets have
different features from traditional one sided markets.
They are much more difficult to define, not only
because they can be multisided, but also because a
communication technology firm is not really associated
with one particular industry or one particular market.
It can diversify and it can benefit from scope
economies as well as scale economies, so therefore it
can move from sector to sector.
While I was a non executive board member of the OFT
(from 2007 to 2014) there was a review of the
Facebook/Instagram merger in 2012.

I remember

that

we felt that the evidence before the OFT did not show
that Instagram would be particularly well placed to
compete against Facebook. Furthermore, there were
many other likely candidates to compete with Facebook.
So the OFT concluded that the merger did not raise a
competition issue.

Yet, in less than two years
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Instagram had become a social media competing with
Facebook. This is to show that it can be difficult to
identify a potential competition issue.
Identifying markets is one challenge.
Identifying a business model for platforms is another
one.

Understanding how competition among ecosystems

works, as opposed to competition among firms, has been
quite challenging.
that we have

Those are some of the difficulties

faced in this particular area.

Now if we go to information technology, I
think that the issues are a bit different.
First of all, information technology has
been dominated by the emergence of artificial
intelligence and machine learning algorithms.

Those

developments have had a number of consequences.
One of them is to create a link between the
consumers and suppliers because the information that
the consumers

provide during their consumption

becomes an input into the production process of
suppliers, so there is a loop there that does not
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exist, at least not with

comparable importance, in

the non digital world.
The second consequence has to do with the
fact that

because of the way artificial intelligence

has been developed means that there actually is an
impetus towards concentration because when algorithms
are trained the more data they are fed, the better
they get at predicting or finding regularities.

This

means that the firm that has more data, everything
else being equal, has an advantage over its
competitors.

Thus there is a natural tendency toward

the concentration of data gathering,

as well as a

concentration of firms which use those algorithms.
So developments in information technology
have really been a force against competition rather
than a force moving in the direction of competition.
We have been struggling with this because
the catch is that as data gets concentrated and as
concentration of firms on the market increases,

the

quality of the digital services they offer improves,
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so it is very hard to separate the anticompetitive
part of the mechanism from the pro-efficiency part of
it.
JAMES KEYTE:

Let me stop you there.

Executive Vice President Vestager used the phrase
several times “contestable markets” and wanting to
make markets more contestable.
From the U.S. perspective, markets are what
they are and you are either engaging in misconduct or
you are not, whether or not your market is contestable
or not.

Obviously, that goes to entry barriers and

market structure and concentration and durability of
market power.
But it seemed that what I was hearing is
that there is a policy of wanting to make markets more
contestable.

It goes right to your issue of there are

positive network effects and scale and scope in this
kind of space that are good for consumers but yet
might make the market less contestable.
balance that?

That is a tough question.

How do you
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FREDERIC JENNY:

That is a very tough

question, and that is a question that can lead to very
different answers from one country to another.
You know that in Europe we have a particular
concern with dominant firms and a particular focus on
market structure.

There are many historical reasons

for this which I do not have time to go into but one
of the most obvious is that many dominant firms in
Europe did not become dominant because they were
efficient but because they enjoyed some kind of
protection from competition. Thus there is no
particular reason to have a favorable a priori with
respect to dominant firms. This explains why Europeans
have the notion that dominant firms should have a
special responsibility to ensure that they do not
restrict competition.
This starting point is quite different from
the general assumption underlying

U.S. antitrust law

that market power is usually the sign of superior
economic performance and that it is only if it is
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demonstrated that firms with market power have abused
their position that they should be sanctioned.
Thus in Europe, the tolerance for aggressive
strategies by dominant firms is much lower than the
tolerance in the US for aggressive strategies by firms
with market power. In the US such aggressive tactics
will be considered normal in most cases and only
reprehensible if they are shown to eliminate efficient
competition on the market. In Europe they will be
considered violations of competition law if they are
likely to alter the structure of the market and to
make life “ unnecessarily” difficult for their current
or potential competitors.
This difference between approaches in Europe
and the US, combined with the fact that European
competition law enforcers and courts are more
concerned with type II errors and the US with type I
errors, is not specific to the digital economy, but is
of course applicable to the digital sector.

Hence, I

think this explains partly what Mrs. Vestager was
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saying.
Now, I have not yet read the House report.
JAMES KEYTE:

I haven’t either.

FREDERIC JENNY:

I will.

And I will.

But I hear that there is some European
inspiration

in views sometimes expressed in the US

that concentration is bad in itself irrespective of
whether or not it leads to improved services.
JAMES KETE:

Yes.

of our instant surveys:

I had a question in one

“Are you in the Schumpeter

camp, the Arrow camp, or ‘I don’t know what you’re
talking about?’”

There was a lot of “I don’t know

what you’re talking about.”
This battle between what is good for
innovation and consumers — is it concentration through
innovation with positive network effects, or is it
better to structure the marketplace so that you have
more people trying to innovate but you structure it
through antitrust enforcement or regulation — I think
is the critical debate.
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I hear that the House report indicates that
“Well, if you don’t do it in the courts, we are going
to do it through legislation.”
Part of the question is: Does that in some
sense avoid the difficult question of balancing
something that inspires innovation and is good for
consumers but could have effects on deterring entry
and innovation from smaller rivals?
What is your view on whether this should be
played out through enforcers or in the marketplace
versus “Let’s just stop and legislate this kind of
situation?”
FREDERIC JENNY:

That is another tough

question which will take quite a while to answer.
JAMES KEYTE:

It’s a Fireside Chat question.

FREDERIC JENNY:

There are again several

considerations to keep in mind to answer your
question.
First of all, I think that one has to
distinguish between various options.
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One option is to propose a specific sectoral
regulation for the digital economy with one or a set
of regulators.
JAMES KEYTE:

Right.

FREDERIC JENNY:
In Europe

a second

regulatory option is considered.

The idea is that competition authorities should have
tools allowing them to intervene on the structure or
on the behavior of firms even if there is no
competition law violation. The argument is that the
focus of competition law enforcement is too narrow to
deal with the situation in the digital sector. To
intervene European competition authorities must find a
violation such as an abuse of dominance. This is
sometimes too complicated and it takes too long.

So

two ideas are being floated. First, one idea would be
to allow competition authorities to intervene in the
digital sector, on their own initiative or at the
request of parties, with structural or behavioral
remedies as interim measures (i.e. before having
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established a violation). A second idea would be to
allow competition authorities to impose structural or
behavioral remedies on the basis of a market
investigation or enquiry.
This line of reasoning is akin to a
suggestion to give

competition authorities

regulatory powers.
JAMES KEYTE:

But without the predicate, as

you said, of having to prove a violation.
FREDERIC JENNY:

But without having to prove

a violation, absolutely.
This second approach is considered to have
two advantages.

First of all, it would allow

competition authorities to intervene earlier or faster
than in the classical adjudicative process.

Second,

at least with respect to the proposal to give
competition authorities the power to impose structural
remedies following a market investigation, this would
allow competition authorities to intervene without
risking being overturned by a court.
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JAMES KEYTE:

Right.

are probably the same ones.
FREDERIC JENNY:

And the disadvantages

[Laughter]

That’s right.

When I say

it has an advantage, it has an advantage from the
point of view of competition authorities that want to
intervene more freely.
The clear risk of these proposals is that
they will lead to over enforcement.
Finally, there is a third possible option
which is to let competition authorities intervene with
the tools they already have and have courts review
their decisions.
A

perceived problem

with this third option

is that competition law enforcement is

a slow process

which may not be effective when applied to a type of
activity which is very dynamic and where scope
economies, scale economies, network effects, tipping
effects and the power of information technology tools
may lead to firms very rapidly acquiring entrenched
positions which cannot be undone easily ex post.
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Another perceived problem with this process
is that the judges who review competition authorities’
decisions will need to understand highly complex and
technical details about the economics and the dynamics
of the digital economy, a challenge for which they may
not be well prepared.
Everybody has in mind the precedent of the
credit cards payment services. Those were cases that
in many countries were the first cases for which
competition authorities and courts had to deal with
competition issues on multi-sided markets. For more
than a decade we have had contradictory competition
authority and court decisions on how to analyze
competition issues on such markets and many of those
decisions and judgments revealed a poor understanding
of what multisided markets were all about. Avoiding a
similar long lasting level of confusion and
contradictions in the digital sector seems to be
advisable. So traditional competition law enforcement
can be a very slow, very erratic, very costly process
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when the competition issues are new in a complex
environment such as in the digital sector.
My own take on these issues is twofold.
First, I believe that if competition
authorities are given ex ante regulatory powers for
the digital sector there will be a double risk. First,
the risk that those powers will be extended to other
non digital markets and, second, the risk that the
distinction between competition law enforcement and
regulation will be blurred, thus making competition
law enforcement less transparent, less consistent and
less understandable.
Second, I think that because, first, all
competition authorities throughout the world are faced
simultaneously with the challenge of finding the
appropriate way to analyze competition issues in the
digital sector, and, second, because digital
competition issues are transnational by nature, this
is a perfect opportunity for competition authorities
to cooperate and work together on the production of
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guidelines or best practices which could serve as a
common reference for all competition authorities
throughout the world when they face competition issues
in the digital sector. A joint initiative in this
direction between the OECD, the ICN and UNCTAD with
the help of the business and the academic communities
would be most welcome.
JAMES KEYTE:

That’s perfect.

I could ask you so many more questions about
this, but I will leave the open question:

What do you

think will happen in Europe, in the United States, and
in the United Kingdom with respect to this difficult
balance and these strategies and tactics that are
going on between the enforcement agencies, the courts,
and even at the OECD?
But we will have to leave that for another
chat, perhaps next September live.
FREDERIC JENNY:
JAMES KEYTE:

In person.

Yes, in person.

I thank you so much for such an interesting
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conversation.
now.
much.

It is so relevant and present right

It was just fascinating.

Fred, thank you so

I’m sure everybody in the virtual ballroom

appreciated it, and I hope to see you very soon, and
certainly next year live.
FREDERIC JENNY: Thank you for having me.

